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1.

Introduction
There are numerous arguments why foreign aid should be given to less developed countries. Two views are dominating (White 1974) : in the sixties the "optimists" (e. g. Chenery and Strout (1966) , Fei and Ranis (1968) ) hoped that with the assistance of the industrial states the Third World would be able to develop rather quickly so that the major economic problems (food production and provision, literacy, industrial development) could be solved. However, in the seventies and eighties, the "pessimists" (e. g. Bauer (1971 Bauer ( , 1984 , Griffin (1970) , Griffin and Enos (1970) and , recently, Erler (1984) ) gained more and more ground quering the positive relationship between foreign aid and growth.
These two basic views concerning the effects of foreign aid can also be found in the literature on the motives determining the aid giving behavior of developed countries towards the Third World. The 'recipient need model' is development-oriented and is based on a humanitarian and altruistic view: foreign aid is given to those underdeveloped countries which have the greatest need for it. On the other side, it is argued that foreign aid is provided by the industrial world without the latter taking any great interest in an independent development of the least developed countries. The "donor interest model' states that foreign aid is given to those countries which either have a political or military alliance with the donor country, and/or the donor country wants to maintain its sphere of interest and/or intends to promote its own foreign trade.
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on economic foreign aid considering different institutional arrangements. The purpose is not to explain how effective foreign aid is. Instead, in analysing the actual distribution of development aid, we want to explain for what reasons official financial aid is given to Third World countries. Isolating the main determinants of economic foreign aid should provide us with some insights into the underlying motives. We will refer to the classical economic behavioral model which states that the actors behave rationally in the sense that they try to maximize their own utility subject to various economic, political and institutional constraints. We will focus on two institutional arrangements: (i) the distribution of bilateral foreign aid as determined by the interaction of voters, national bureaucracy and government in a donor country; and (ii) the distribution of multilateral foreign aid as determined by the interaction of donor countries and international organisations.
Section 2 gives a short review of the pertinent literature. In Section 3, an attempt is made to develop a politico-economic model to explain the distribution of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid among developing countries. The main hypotheses are empirically tested in Section 4. Finally, a summary is provided in Section 5 and some (preliminary) conclusions are drawn.
Discussion of Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Aid in Literature
Up to now, several studies have been made to analyse which countries receive bilateral foreign aid and which do not. Traditionally, a cross-country analysis is undertaken investigating how important standard economic factors like per capita income or the size of the population of recipient country are. The empirical studies (e.g. Davenport (1969) , Henderson (1971) and Isenmann (1976)) focus on two biases in aid allocation: a country-size bias reflected by the tendency for per capita assistance to be inversely related to population size, and a middle-income bias stating that bilateral foreign aid increases with per catita GNP up to a relatively high level of income. A survey of this type of studies is given by Dowling and Hiemenz (1985) . In their own empirical investigation, the authors find evidence for the countrysize bias. However, the results do not confirm the middle-income bias. They suggest a low-income bias, i.e. low income countries receive more aid per capita than middle-income countries.
Further economic indicators as well as political variables have been included in several research studies, too. In an early paper on economic and military aid, Kato (1969) already includes several political and economic determinants reflecting strategic, cold-war, trade, economic development and domestic (donor) economy goals. Others like Wittkopf (1972) , Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) , McKinlay and Little (1977) , McKinlay (1979) and Mosley (1981) also allow for additional economic and political factors, i.e. they insert indicators for political importance, cold-war considerations, development and performance, economic and political stability, and democracy interests of the donor country. In analysing the aid distribution process, McKinlay and Little explicitly distinguised between two models, the recipient need and the donor interest model. In a recent study, Flemming (1985) structures the influential variables into three categories: he tries to explain bilateral foreign aid as a function of a recipient country's need, its trade dependency on, and political alignment toward, a particular donor.
The empirical results of the previous studies give a mixed picture. There are authors who find some evidence for the influence of economic and political factors; e.g. in their studies McKinlay and Little find bilateral aid being influenced by a variety of indicators. Altogether, they state a clear superiority of the donor interest model. However, contradictory findings are reported, too. The influence of economic and/or political variables on aid distribution appears to be negligible, e.g. economic performance and political stability (Henderson 1971 , McKinlay and Little 1977 , McKinlay 1978 , associations with the communist bloc (McKinlay and Little 1977) , and the intensity of economic ties (Kato 1969 , Wittkopf 1972 . Wittkopf (1973) deals with the recipient country's voting behavior in the United Nations and he concludes that " . . most foreign aid donors are prone to reward their enemies rather than their friends" (p. 878) . Political alignment as used by Flemming (1985) also turns out not to be as conclusive as expected.
So far, all studies concentrate on the supply of foreign aid and do not consider the demand side. An exception is Weck-Hannemann and Frey (1987) , who develop a model of supply and demand of foreign aid. They test their model with data for the United States over the years 1979 to 1985. They find very weak (empirical) evidence with respect to both, economic and political indicators. According to their findings U.S. bilateral foreign aid is influenced only by one political factor: a country belonging to the traditional sphere of influence of the United States cet. par. receives more economic foreign aid than other countries. The authors conclude that on the whole, the model seems to be inadequate able for accounting for the motives and processes determining the allocation, of foreign aid to developing countries. However, the previous years' allocation of aid is better suited for accounting for the current structure of foreign aid given by the U.S. (the same holds for Swiss foreign aid; see Weck-Hannemann 1987) . The dominance of status quo distribution patterns is attributed to the incremental hypothesis (Wildavsky 1964) concentrating on domestic determinants. Like other categories of public expenditure, the allocation of foreign aid is seen to be dominated by administrative forces which resist structural changes (in order to minimize conflict) and which resort to the status quo as a general guideline. In a time-series analysis explaining the total amount of foreign aid given by individual donor counties, Mosley (1985) stresses the importance of the bureaucratic process and the dominating influence of the previous year's budget, too.
In contrast to the relatively large number of studies analysing the determinants of bilateral foreign aid, there are only a few studies focusing on the allocation of multilateral aid. Recently, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) try to explain both, bilateral and multilateral aid. For both types of aid they use a recipient need and a donor interest model. In the case of bilateral aid, their empirical findings support the donor interest approach, whereas multilateral aid is best explained by need variables. However, the study has to be criticized as the authors fail to account for the influence of international organisations itself. Especially, they do not have a theoretical model of the behavior of the (decisive) members of the international institutions allocating multilateral foreign aid. Frey and Schneider (1986) explicitly try to eliminate this shortcoming. Their aim is to analyse the international lending activity by concentrating on the behavior of the World Bank. Four models of World Bank lending to developing countries are designed and empirically tested by pooled time-series and cross-section data. The analysis suggests that a model combining economic and political determinants performs best. Apart froms economic influences, political determinants such as "capitalist" climate or political instability are deemed important, as well as a recipient country's former status as a colony or dominion. This politico-economic model which explicitly captures the influence of a selfish bureaucracy is successfully been used to forecast the distribution of IBRD loans and IDA credits to developing countries.
This short review of the literature shows that there are several interesting attempts trying to explain bilateral or multilateral foreign aid. However, up to now no systematic approach has been found which considers the different institutional arrangements. To the authors' knowledge, the allocation process of bilateral and multilateral aid has not been modelled explicitly and simultaneously.
3.
Modelling the Distribution of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid: A Politico-Economic Approach
The distribution of bilateral and multilateral aid is influenced by the national government, the bureaucracy (national and/or international), voters/taxpayers and interest groups. It is plausible to assume that some interest groups (e.g. church and nonprofit organisations) and a part of the voters/taxpayers support foreign aid due to altruistic motives. For them, recipient need, i.e. arguments such as poverty or illiteracy, may be important factors for whether or not a developing country should get aid. But there may also be selfish reasons for supporting the poorest countries: people may want redistribution of income to poorer countries as an insurance so that they might receive help in crisis situations, too. In contrast, other interest groups (esp. the export-oriented industry) are not principally interested in humanitarian aid. Rather, they are concerned to promote trade and foreign direct investment. Their interest in aiding developing countries is that such aid may improve their exports to those countries, especially when the aid is formally or informally tied.
The national government has political, economic and military interests. On the one side, a successful development policy might increase the prestige of a government so that chances for reelection can be improved; on the other side, political and military influence in developing countries may be increased. The national bureaucracy tries to increase its influence and to minimize potential conflicts with voters/taxpayers, government and interest groups. The most effective way to achieve these goals is to pursue an incremental policy, i.e. marginally increasing aid expenditure and restisting structural change. This incrementalist behavior does not only apply to public bureaucracies, but to the political process as a whole, which also tends to maintain established proportions and structures.
International organisations can also be regarded as bureaucracies in which the individual members (especially the top officials) further their own utility, subject to economic and political constraints (compare e.g. the models by Niskanen (1971) and Breton and Wintrobe (1982) ). The top bureaucrats' utility consists in the prestige they enjoy within the reference group and the discretionary powers exerted vis-a-vis donor and recipient countries. Prestige can be gained and independence can be strengthened by 'performance excellence', i. e. by demonstrating that the organisation's tasks are handled competently; e.g. World Bank officials try to gain prestige within the banking community. In this case, performance excellence is shown by keeping to the commonly observed conservative standards for lending, endeavoring to avoid major blunders and risks. The most important constraint for World Bank officials is interference by the donor countries through their financial contributions, their voting rights or informal channels. The donor countries tend to intervene in favour of those developing countries which 'depend' on them, i.e. which are former colonies or dominions and/or trading partners.
In contrast to the World Bank, other international organisations like the United Nations agencies or the International Development Banks (e.g. the U.N. Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the African, Caribbean or Asian Development Banks) may try to gain prestige within the reference groups of other charitable organisations. Thus, they bring in line the allocation of foreign aid with recipients need and not with conservative lending standards, e.g. low risk of default. Conversely, a country with a high risk of default may be more reliant on external financial help than a more creditworthy country, thus attracting more foreign aid due to humanitarian motives. Furthermore, the top officials' discretionary power is determined by donor and recipient countries, as both exert an influence due to voting rights in these bodies. The financial constraint of getting funds -and therefore the influence of the donor countries -also may be weakened by logrolling in political affairs in the United Nations General Assembly.
The answer to what the main determinants dominating the allocation of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid are depends on the institutional arrangements under which the political decisionmaking process takes place. It is argued that bilateral aid is mainly influenced by the national government and the national bureaucracy. Voters and interest groups may exert less influence as foreign aid is a public good furthering free-riding behavior. For industrial interest groups it is more profitable to make efforts to directly get export promotion, e.g. in the form of guarantees. Therefore, it is assumed that the interests of the government and the national bureaucracy clearly dominate the allocation of bilateral aid. The government uses foreign aid as an instrument to strengthen its economic, political and military position. The national bureaucracy intends to steadily increase the budget for foreign aid without structural changes. The argument of 'recipient need' only is used to justify the amount and allocation of bilateral aid towards the voters.
Multilaterial aid is grouped into two categories: (i) those international organisations which are oriented towards the banking community will stress performance excellence using a conservative lending behavior, i.e. those countries get help which show a low risk of default. In addition, the interests of the major donor countries have to be allowed for, i.e. developing countries with political and/or economic ties to the donor countries (former colonies and dominions and the main trading partners) are given priority, (ii) The other international institutions (U.N. agencies and International Development Banks) show performance excellence by helping the most needy countries. However, constraints in the form of interference of the donor countries are less pronounced.
TABLE 1
In Table 1 , the hypotheses about the bilateral and multilaterial lending behavior are summarized. The relative importance of the different arguments is shown, too. In the case of bilateral aid, the political, economic and military interests of donor governments and the influence of the national bureaucracy are expected Explanations: '+' indicates that a positive influence is expected, i. e. the more positive this influence is the more aid is expected, ceteris paribus, the opposite holds for '-'. In detail:
'+' = weak positive influence '++' = strong positive influence 1 +++' = very strong positive influence ' ' = very strong negative influence n.s. = no significant influence.. to be strongest. In the case of multilateral aid, performance excellence within the banking community is dominating for the World Bank, whereas for other organisations the need criteria are emphasized.
Empirical Investigation
In order to empirically test our hypotheses, we have used a cross-country regression analysis (five-year averages). The dependent and independent variables are operationalized as follows (more details and the sources of the data are given in the Appendix):
Three dependent variables are distinguised: A poor performance excellence (i.e. a low value of the IICR index) can also be used as NEED criteria showing that a country is not creditworthy among the international banking community and thus cet. par. needs more aid from other organisations.
(d)
Influence of the bureaucracy in donor countries and in international organisations:
lagged
The influence of the bureaucracy in the donor dependent countries and in the international organisavariable tions is measured by the influence of past years' credits/aid on current credit/aid given to a developing country.
However, a positive and significant influence of the lagged dependent variable may be due to other explanations, too. E.g. the fact that projects often run over several years also account for an impact of previous years' allocation of foreign aid. In our empirical examination this effect is weakened by focusing on committments rather than on actual disbursements of foreign aid.
After determining the dependent and independent.variables we have the following three estimation equations:
( II 37 developing countries receiving loans from the World Bank, and 49 developing countries are studied which get multilateral aid from U.N. agencies and other organisations (the data are shown in detail in the Appendix). The estimation results for bilateral aid (BADAC) , for aid/credits from the World Bank (MAIBRD) , and for total multilateral aid except IBRD commitments (MAUNO) are given in Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively. TABLES 2, 3 and 4
Let us first consider the results for bilateral aid (Table 2) : the coefficient of determination (adjusted for the degrees of freedom) varies between 35 and 36 per cent. It increases to 65 per cent if the lagged dependent variable is included. This variable measuring the incremental influence of national bureaucracy is highly significant and demonstrates that 70 per cent of past years' aid is provided this year again. The coefficients of the variables indicating recipient need, i.e. GNP per capita and the NEED index, have the expected sign but they are not empirically significant. However, the IICR index, used as a need criterion, turns out to have a negative and statistically significant influence, thus indicating that developing countries with a high risk of default cet. par. get more bilateral aid from DAC countries than creditworthy countries. Considering the political, military and economic variables, the estimates show that former US dominions and former British colonies cet. par. receive more foreign aid than the other "countries. The arms transfers of Eastern states have the expected negative influence and are also statistically significant if the lagged dependent variable is not included. The estimated coefficients of the other independent variables have the expected sign but they are not statistically significant. In general, the empirical results of the regression analysis for bilateral aid do not strongly confirm the hypothesis of a dominant influence of the governments' political, economic and military interests. However, the estimates reveal evidence for the incremental hypothesis of bureaucratic behavior as the status quo is strongly influenced by the aid distribution in the previous period. Compared with the empirical findings of other studies, our results seem quite satisfactory. At least two out of five hypotheses cannot be rejected. Furthermore it should be -The figures in parantheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values; an asterisk in parantheses means that the variable has a significant influence at the 90% level of confidence; one asterisk indicates that the variable has a significant influence at the 95% level, and two asterisks at the 99% level of confidence (all two-tailed tests). R 2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for the degrees of freedom (d.f.). The F-yalue indicates whether in total the independent variables have a significant impact on the dependent variable. noted that the problem of outliers in the country sample has been properly taken into account in our regressions which has not been the case in other studies (e.g. Wittkopf 1972, Maizels and Nissanke 1984) .
Bibliothek des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
In the regression results discussed above we have excluded outliers like Israel. Costa Rica and Jamaica. On the average of the years 1981 to 1985, Israel in the mean cet. par. received about US$ 300 more bilateral aid from DAC countries than all other developing countries. Bilateral aid given to the other two countries exceeded the average by about US$ 60 per capita. In Table  2a , this effect is shown by the regression results in columns (b) and (c) . There, Israel and the other outliers are included and modelled as dummy variables. However, if we exclude these outliers and do not explicitly model them with the help of dummy variables, we get quite different results which are shown in table 2a, column (a).
TABLE 2A
Contrary to former results, the GNP per capita now shows a coefficient with a positive and highly significant sign; i.e. a country in the Third World gets the less bilateral aid from DAC countries the poorer it is. As before, the IICR index has a negative and even stronger influence, indicating that risky countries get more foreign aid than creditworthy ones. The variables showing the importance of a developing country in political, military or economic respects now indicate quite different results, too. Political dependence, measured by the variables USCOL, UKCOL and FCOL, no longer has a remarkable influence and the sign of the estimated coefficients is even negative in two of three cases. On the other hand, arms transfers from both Western and Eastern countries have a highly significant effect statistically. As expected, arms transfers from Western countries strongly increase and arms transfers from the USSR decrease support by DAC countries. Exports from Eastern countries also reduce bilateral aid in a statistically significant way, whereas exports from Western states have an unexpectedly negative, but statistically insignificant influence on bilateral aid commitments. See footnote (1), Table 2 .
If we model Israel as a dummy variable (Table 2a , column b), the strong influence of the variables GNP per capita, arms transfers from Western countries and exports from Eastern states vanishes. Additionally modelling Costa Rica and Jamaica as outliers does not change the results in a significant way, except, the variable of arms transfers from the USSR again gets a negative significant coefficient. To sum up these results, we have to conclude that if one does not undertake a careful econometrical test for outliers and does not explicitly take the latter into account one might obtain totally misleading results showing a strong influence of variables which are only due to one or two observations. This is the case e.g. in the studies by Wittkopf (1972) and Maizels and Nissanke (1985) ; their empirical findings, hence, are questionable. Maizels and Nissanke partly come out with a high coefficient of determination and a strong influence of the political and security interests variables on bilateral aid which is mainly due to the fact that Israel is not excluded from the sample.
In Table 3 , the regression results for the multilateral aid of the World Bank are given. Without the lagged dependent variable the coefficient of determination amounts to 37 to 45 per cent of the variance; it increases to 45 to 50 per cent of the variance if the lagged dependent variable is included. The estimated coefficients show that multilateral aid by the World Bank is positively influenced by the GNP per capita, as expected. However, the IICR index, representing the performance excellence within the banking community, turns out not to be statistically different from zero and even has a negative (i.e. unexpected) sign. Surprisingly, almost all coefficients of former colonies have an unexpected (negative) sign. There is only one exception (U.S. dominions) , but this influence is not statistically significant. As expected, arms transfers from Western and Eastern countries have a positive and negative coefficient, respectively. However, the impact is statistically negligible, too. However, World Bank lending is influenced by the exports from Western countries in a positive and statistically significant way, i.e. that developing countries absorbing a high share of Western exports are privileged with respect to the credits given by the World Bank. The allocation of multilateral aid in the current period is also influenced by past years' lending policy, although in one case the coefficient is only significant on a 90 per cent confidence level.
The estimates for the multilateral aid given by the U.N. agencies and other international organisations are shown in Table 4 . As expected, multilateral aid is influenced by the GNP per capita in a negative and statistically significant way. The IICR index has a negative and significant influence too, which is consistent with the interpretation of this variable as a recipient need measure. Former U.S. dominions and French colonies attract additional multilateral aid -as expected -and a positive impact of exports from Western states is also confirmed. Pre-period commitments again have a positive and significant coefficient, referring to the incremental behavior of bureaucrats in the international organisations. The estimates show that actual commitments are determined by previous multilateral aid by about 25 per cent. Multilateral aid from the U.N. and other organisations is explained quite well by the model: as is shown by the coefficient of determination, two thirds of the variance are explained. The R 2 has a value of 54 to 58 per cent without lagged dependent variable, and it increases from 65 to 69 per cent if the lagged dependent variable is included.
Comparing the empirical results for the three different types of foreign aid, it turns out that the bureaucratic influence is strongest in the case of bilateral aid (with a coefficient of 0.73) . It is followed by the one for aid by the World Bank (with a much lower coefficient of 0.48) . And multilateral aid by U.N. agencies and other international organisations is influenced by previous commitments with a value of 0.27. Recipient need indicated by the GNP per capita plays no significant role in the case of bilateral aid, whereas World Bank credits and multilateral aid from the other international organisations are strongly influenced by this variable. Interestingly, as expected, the sign of the coefficient is positive in the regressions for the World Bank credits and it switches to negative in the regressions for multilateral aid by the other international development organisations. The IICR index also has a highly significant negative influence in the case of bilateral aid and multilateral aid from U.N. and other organisations. As mentioned above this corresponds with the assumption that this index can be interpreted as a need proxy, i.e. developing countries with a high risk of default are given more bilateral and multilateral aid for humanitarian reasons. In contrast to our theoretical expectations, the IICR index has no statistical influence on the allocation of World Bank credits. Although this differs from our expectations, it . is consistent in that the impact is less than in the case of bilateral aid and multilateral aid given by other organisations. Surprisingly, the variables measuring the influence of the government in political, military or economic respects have no statistically significant influence in several cases. Especially, there is no important impact on bilateral aid, whereas in the case of multilateral aid of U.N. and other organisations the political variables have some influence -which is directly opposed to our expectations. However, bilateral aid is determined to some extent by the variable of arms transfer variable from the USSR, whereas we cannot observe a significant influence of this variable in the regressions for both types of multilateral aid -as we originally expected.
Considering the share of Western exports to developing countries, this variable has an influence on multilateral aid in total, but it does not account for the allocation of bilateral aid, which is again contrary to our theoretical expectation.
Summary and Preliminary Conclusions
This study focuses on the determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid given to developing countries. We try to model the allocation process of different types of foreign aid and derive testable hypotheses using the public choice framework. The decisive motives are identified by explicitly taking into account the (rational) behavior of the main decision makers (voters/taxpayers, interest groups, government, national bureaucracy, and the officials in international organisations) as well as the alternative institutional arrangements under which the allocation process takes place. The statistical analysis reveals that, at least to some extent, the determinants used account for the aid allocation of each bilateral aid by DAC countries, credits by the World Bank, and multilateral aid given by the U.N. agencies and other international organisations (except the World Bank). However, the comparative evaluation of the estimates concerning the determinants of the different types of foreign aid turns out to be less satisfactory. There is only limited evidence for our graded hypotheses. Nevertheless, the estimates confirm the incremental hypothesis that the bureaucrats' behavior has the strongest impact on bilateral aid. Also, bilateral aid commitments are partly influenced by recipients' need and political and military aspects, which also account for the allocation of multilateral aid by U.N. agencies and other international organisations. On the other hand, World Bank credits are not allocated out' of humanitarian motives. Yet, performance excellence turns out not to be as important as is theoretically expected.
These results may point to the fact that the intent of this study is too pretentious -be it theoretically or with respect to the empirical investigation and data. It may therefore be concluded that the main emphasis should be placed on a more careful and detailed analysis of the interests, the incentives structure of and the constraints on the various actors in the international politico-economic process. However, we also have to think about other (better) ways of empirically testing our theoretical hypotheses in the context of international cross-country studies.
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